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CHRISTOPHER ROWE’S PLATO AND THE ART OF
PHILOSOPHICAL WRITING
GEORGE RUDEBUSCH
Northern Arizona University
Interpretation
“The biggest question of all” in the book is “What is it, exactly, that Plato
wanted to achieve, and thought he could achieve, by writing as he did?” (p. 2).
As the book sees them, “Plato’s texts . . . force us to try to see whatever point it
is that they are making through the fog of a conversation with this individual
now” (p. 11).
The book begins its answer to the big question by making some uncontro-
versial claims about philosophical dialogue. The questing after truth—about
how to live an excellent human life—is, according to the book, true philosophy:
“Philosophy, as an activity, is the “art of dialogue” . . . on the sorts of subjects
expertise in which contributes to wisdom” (p. 8). The book identifies this art of
dialogue in order to distinguish it from rhetorical persuasion.
For the book, it is reasonable to suppose that “the dialogues . . . have a
persuasive function . . . in addition to any purely philosophical one” (p. 12).
The book distinguishes the persuasive function of rhetoric from the philosophi-
cal function of dialectic. As I interpret the book, The Art of Philosophical Writing,1
the art that is the topic of the book is not philosophical dialectic but persuasive
rhetoric.
The book’s point in drawing a distinction between philosophical dialogue
and persuasive rhetoric is that in the case of Plato’s dialogues “the philosophi-
cal will be employed in the service of the persuasive” (p. 12). Philosophical
writing employs philosophical dialogue in the service of persuasive rhetoric.
The subordination of philosophy to rhetoric justifies the book’s claim that, in
the case of Plato, “written dialogue is something considerably more than a
piece of philosophy” (p. 10) and also justifies its claim that the fact that Plato
“employed dialogue form in different ways, some of them not portraying
dialectic in action, does not . . . indicate that he ever abandoned his view that
living dialogue, based on questioning of oneself or others . . . was the only
available means to intellectual progress” (p. 10).
The big question was, “What was Plato’s goal in writing as he did?” As I
interpret the book, the big answer—I take this to be the main thesis of the
book—is that Plato’s writing is an art of persuasive rhetoric, employing in its
service philosophical dialogue. And the goal of the rhetoric is to persuade readers
to turn to a life in which they seek wisdom about human excellence through philosophical
dialogue.
1. C. Rowe, The Art of Philosophical Writing (••, ••).
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It is a consequence of the book’s big answer that it can defend a Unitarian
thesis about Plato’s philosophical career, despite the sharp contrasts in the style
and content of Plato’s dialogues. These contrasts seem to corroborate Aristo-
tle’s view that the character Socrates in the dialogues is sometimes a historical
portrait, while at other times merely a mouthpiece for Plato’s own views. The
book’s big answer allows it to explain why sharp contrasts in style and content
need not correspond to a sharp contrast in Plato’s philosophical career. Indeed,
the bulk of the book is devoted to giving such explanations for a number of
Plato’s dialogues.
In style, for example, the book recognizes an appearance of sharp contrast
between Socratic dialogues (full of mostly unsuccessful search) and non-Socratic
dialogues (full of mostly successful answer). Here is the book’s explanation:
“What the situation in the “non-Socratic” . . . dialogues marks is a change of
strategy, not a change of mind. If Plato writes in a different way, that is because
he has decided to approach his readers . . . by a different route . . . Even while
insisting that philosophy is the key, he by no means always uses dialectic or the
written counterpart of dialectic to achieve that stimulation and provocation. In
fact philosophical dialectic is merely one of his tools” (p. 13).
Coining my own terms for a distinction the book draws, I call the book’s
Plato a weak intellectualist throughout his Unitarian career. A strong intellectualist
dismisses the tripartite soul as “mere illusion” (p. 170). In contrast, the weak
intellectualist is an intellectualist about “what the soul really is”—but that soul
is “hidden” in “what it actually becomes, in [embodied] life” (p. 170). Being
“made up of . . . three parts . . . isn’t how the soul really is, in its essential
(“truest”) nature” (pp. 170–1). But tripartite is what the soul actually becomes,
whenever people “choose to go that way. Appetite may be a monster, but in
itself . . . it is only a potential monster” (p. 172). Plato as a weak intellectualist
finds himself sometimes addressing souls who have not achieved their truest
nature and have monstrously overpowering appetites. He can use one genre of
writing—dialectic—for the intellects of such people, while using other genres—
involving myths or graphic images—for their spirits, so that such souls as a
whole can begin to move toward harmony by taming their appetites.2
In the substance of Plato’s dialogues, the book recognizes a sharp contrast
between, on the one hand, for example, the apparent intellectualism of some
dialogues, which argue as if human excellence is nothing but knowledge how to
live well, and on the other hand, the apparent nonintellectualism of other dia-
logues, in which the soul has three parts and in which knowledge is not enough
for an excellent life, dialogues where virtues of character are required in
addition to virtue of intellect. The general form of the book’s explanation for
this and other substantial contrasts in the dialogues is that when Plato portrays
dialectic in action, such as the conversations with Polus or Thrasymachus,
Socrates begins with different starting points appropriate to different interlocu-
tors, and in such dialectic, different starting points compel different conclusions.
For example, about “the political and psychological analyses conducted in
Republic 4,” the book says, “there is a question mark over the level of Socrates’
2. See my “Swan Songs, Last Words and Myth’s Aim,” Thomist, 56 (1992), pp. 726–32.
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(and Plato’s) commitment to [the conclusions, because] . . . the argument is
itself shaped as much by the interlocutors’ assumptions and starting-points as
by his own. Left to himself . . . Socrates makes quite clear [that] he would have
rather different things to say about the best kind of city and the best state of the
soul” (p. 17).
First Evaluation: Small and Big Questions
The book says that “for anyone who has seriously read any . . . dialogue from
beginning to end,” “the biggest question of all” is “What is it, exactly, that Plato
wanted to achieve . . . by writing as he did?” (p. 2). This is a meta-question, an
academic question. In my judgment, there are much bigger questions for the
serious reader. For example, there is the existential question Callicles asks in
the Gorgias. Socrates has just concluded his argument with Polus: “To do wrong
to another and get away with it, unpunished, is the worst thing that can happen
to a man” (p. 479d). Upon hearing this, Callicles appropriately replies:
“Socrates, if what you say turns out to be true, aren’t we human beings living
our lives upside down and doing everything quite the opposite of what we
ought?” I agree with Callicles: everything important in human life hangs on the question
whether Socrates’ arguments are sound—not on the biographical question: “What
were Plato’s goals when he wrote the dialogues?” In my judgment, the book’s
scale of measurement about what is big and small for a serious reader needs to
be turned upside down: Existential questions are big and authorial intent is
small.
Second Evaluation: Inferior and Superior Answers
In order to make my second evaluation, I need to make an observation about
one advantage of Socratic conversation and to review the Divided Line.
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, “in classical Greek Drama, [sti-
chomythia is] dialogue in alternate lines, employed in sharp disputation, and
characterized by antithesis.” As examples, there are the disputations between
Haemon and Creon in Sophocles’ Antigone and between Orestes and the
Chorus in the trial scene of Aeschylus’s Eumenides.
Socrates refers to the event that I call stichomythia in an extended sense in the
Euthyphro—when “we get angry and hostile to each other because we disagree
and are unable to arrive at a decision” (7c10–12). As Socrates says, this
happens not about matters we know how to settle by counting, weighing, and
measuring, but about “the righteous and unrighteous, praiseworthy and dis-
graceful, good and bad” (7d1–2).
Stichomythia about what is righteous, praiseworthy, and good remains a
mark of our personal moral and shared political lives. For example, human
beings lack the ability to weigh the competing values of autonomy and benevolence
in a wide range of cases, leading to irresolvable disputes within a person or a
family, such as: When should I cease to make life decisions for my teen-age children as their
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intellects become more and more fully formed? When should I begin to make decisions for my
elderly parents, as their intellects become more and more disabled? We are likewise unable
decisively to weigh such values in our national deliberations about such things
as legislating minimum wages or sex workers or sweat shops or trade in human
organs or payday loan companies. I take it that such stichomythia is the
defining existential problem for human beings.
My observation is that the great existential advantage of Socratic conversa-
tion is that it solves the problem of stichomythia. Socrates does not oppose
point with counterpoint. He does not oppose at all. He merely asks questions.
The interlocutor does not find himself making speeches opposed to rival
speeches by Socrates. Instead, the interlocutor finds that stichomythia is
replaced by self-examination, Socratically assisted.
I turn now to the Divided Line. As human beings, we seek answers to
questions of the form What is X? such as What is the large? or What is a finger?
There are two main kinds of answer: ostensive and discursive.
Ostensive—that is, visible—answers work by pointing out particular instances
of what is large, like this building or this room. There is a problem with
ostension. Particular instances of what is large will inevitably also be instances
of, say, crowded or empty, well or poorly lit, warm or cold, and many other things that
are not large. Worse, particular instances of large will inevitably also be, in
some respects, small. Because of their multifaceted and even contrary nature,
visible instances are ambiguous and relatively unclear answers to questions.
In contrast to ostensive answers, discursive answers draw attention to intelli-
gible, not visible objects—these are Plato’s Forms. By doing so, discursive
answers avoid the unclarity of being ambiguous and contrary. Relative to
visible instances, intelligible general accounts give us single-faceted hence unam-
biguous and hence relatively clear answers.
In the Republic,3 Socrates divides an imaginary line in proportion to the
relative “clarity and obscurity” (509d9) of these different kinds of answers. The
main division he makes on the line of more and less clear gives us a ratio of
intelligible, discursive answers to visible, ostensive answers. Then, Socrates
subdivides the two main parts.
There is a subdivision of the visible, between visible images and the things of
which they are images. For example, take the question: What is Socratic dialogue?
One kind of answer points out a visible image of Socratic dialogue, say, a printed
Platonic text. While such a text is a kind of ostensive definition, Socrates says
that there is another, clearer kind of visible answer. It is to show the
questioners—to use my example—a living Socratic conversation by actually
cross-examining them on the subject of human excellence. This living instance
of Socratic dialogue belongs to the more clear subdivision of visible answers,
while the written record of such a dialogue belongs to the less clear subdivision
of visible answers.
In the same ratio of relative clarity and obscurity as the subdivisions of the
visible, Socrates also subdivides the intelligible. The less clear subdivision of the
intelligible proceeds down from hypotheses to conclusions—like Euclidean geometry
3. Plato, Republic (••, ••).
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(510c2, 511b1)—while in the more clear subdivision, as the book translates,
“Reason will “grasp” the uppermost of the four segments of the line “through
its capacity for dialectic, treating its hypotheses not as [starting points, •rc•ς]
but actually as hypotheses, with the purpose [of] proceeding until it reaches the
unhypothetical” answer, not working down to a conclusion but going up “to
the starting point (•rc•n) of the whole” (219) and only from that point going
back down to a conclusion.4
Here, for example, is my hypothetical account in answer to the question,
what is Socratic dialogue? Like Euclidean geometry, my answer sets out start-
ing points from which it derives an account. Like Euclid, I allow myself five
starting points:
• Nonphilosophers are blameworthy because they negligently act as if they
know the ultimate human goods, while philosophers, seeking the wisdom
they lack, are free from blame.
• Socrates’ divine mission was to turn nonphilosophers into philosophers.
• Most people falsely think that the passions can overpower knowledge and
hence falsely think that human excellence requires multiple character traits
in addition to the single knowledge of human well-being.
• Socrates can refute most people who claim to know human excellence by
getting them to take on a claim that excellence is multiple, then eliciting a
contradiction.
• Socrates’ refutations of such people are the best way to turn nonphiloso-
phers into philosophers.
Given these five starting points, I can derive my account of Socratic dialogue.5 My
point here is that my account depends upon its starting points. If you accept
contrary starting points, you will derive a contrary account of Socratic dialogue.
Many scholars do accept contrary starting points in their accounts of Socratic
dialogue. My hypothetical answer does not have the resources to be reconciled
with theirs, producing stichomythia. This stichomythia makes the truth of my
hypothetical, Euclid-like answer unclear and illustrates how a hypothetical
answer is an inferior intelligible answer.6 (Inferior hypothetical reasoning is not
the method of hypothesis referred to in other dialogues. That method of
hypothesis is a method for testing hypotheses, rather than taking them for
granted and working down from them to conclusions.)
The superior intelligible answer is dialectic, which treats its hypotheses not as
starting points but “actually as hypotheses, proceeding until it reaches the
unhypothetical” answer (p. 219).7 If I am able to give this kind of dialectical
answer, I would be able to begin with any starting points—in particular, the starting points
of my interlocutor. Whenever the interlocutor gives a statement contrary to one of
my postulates, I would elicit from that interlocutor other statements refuting his
contrary statement.
4. Ibid., 511b4–8.
5. See my Socrates (Wiley-Blackwell, 2009).
6. See Plato, Republic, 509d6-e1, 511a3–8.
7. Ibid., 511b5–7.
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Suppose, for example, that I meet someone who asserts a statement contrary
to my third postulate of Socratic dialogue, that is, someone who states that the
passions can overpower knowledge. If I am dialectical, I can begin from that
contrary statement, and then elicit other statements that lead to contradiction.
If I repeat this process often enough, eventually the interlocutor will have no
alternative but accept my third postulate. And so, by dialectic, I am able, if I
know my stuff, to lead interlocutors eventually to the truth of each of the five
postulates from any statements they make contrary to those postulates. Thus, I am able to
begin from any starting points yet reach, in the case of every interlocutor, the very
same account of Socratic dialectic. This explains why, unlike the Euclidean
kind of hypothetical answer, a dialectical answer is unhypothetical.
Let me sum up. A Euclidean answer can only work downward away from its
starting points to a conclusion. A Euclidean answer is hypothetical and subject
to stichomythia. In contrast, a dialectical answer is unhypothetical: It can begin
from any starting points yet always produce agreement to the same answer. A
dialectical answer is not caught in stichomythia. Thus, the dialectical is supe-
rior in clarity and truth to the hypothetical.
Let me emphasize: Hypothetical answers are not dialectic. Dialectic is better
both for seeking the truth and for teaching the truth. It is better as a truth-
seeking strategy, because its results are not dependent upon possibly false
starting points that go unchallenged. And it is better for persuading or teaching
another the truth, because it begins with the interlocutor’s assertions, even if they
are contrary to the truth.
My interpretation of the Divided Line is one way to justify Plato’s distinction
between hypothetical and unhypothetical intelligibility. Very likely, my
account is wrong, and there is a better way to interpret Plato’s Divided Line.
You do not need to accept my account as anything but provisional. I ask only
that you accept that Plato does make a valid distinction between inferior hypothetical and
superior unhypothetical answers, either according to the details of my interpretation
or according to some better interpretation. (Notice, by the way, that the essay
now in your hands is an inferior hypothetical answer: It is incapable of begin-
ning from your starting points to reach my conclusion.) If you accept that Plato’s
distinction is valid, then you will also agree with my second evaluation of the
book: The book fails to give an account of Plato’s Art of Philosophical Writing. The book
fails because its account of Socratic dialectic is antidialectical.
The book’s confusion of the hypothetical method for unhypothetical dialec-
tic is easy to document. Let me begin from the statement: “The exchange
between Socrates and his interlocutors in the text of the Republic will itself count
as a perfectly acceptable example of the kind of thing dialectic may be” (p. 167).
About Republic 1, the book says, “The real problem is that Socrates has been
talking across rather than to Thrasymachus. [Socrates] may be satisfied with his
own arguments, but he has done little or nothing to persuade his opponent; and
indeed, insofar as he is—as I see it—using assumptions that Thrasymachus will
never even have dreamed of sharing, one could say that he hasn’t even tried”
(p. 177). The features the book attributes to Socrates make his discourse, what
the Divided Line calls, inferior hypothetical discourse. There is Socrates’ use of
starting points that Thrasymachus does not share (“will never even have
84
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dreamed of sharing”) and the resulting stichomythia (“talking across rather than
to Thrasymachus”). Yet, the book says that this discourse is a “perfectly accept-
able example of the kind of thing dialectic may be.” This is a confusion of
hypothetical and dialectical discourse.
There is much more of the same confusion. The book says, “Socrates is using
premisses which are perfectly familiar and true to him, but entirely unfamiliar to
Thrasymachus, who if told what they were would reject them outright” (pp.
186–7). Not only must Socrates be using inferior hypothetical reasoning, he is
apparently hiding the fact from Thrasymachus!
Again, the book says: “It is true that this defence of Socrates’ argument in
one way leaves it looking even worse: not only is it rather a weak argument, but
it doesn’t really address Thrasymachus’s position at all” (p. 193). With Thra-
symachus, “Socrates at every turn begins from positions that he himself holds”
(p. 195). Socrates’ dialogue with Thrasymachus is an inconclusive “confronta-
tion between two opposing perspectives” (p. 195). And “the outcome is that we,
the readers, have two different arguments to choose from. If we opt for the one
Thrasymachus goes along with, then we shall end up about as happy as
Thrasymachus, i.e. not very happy. If on the other hand we opt for the
argument that Socrates has in mind, and that uses [that is, works downward from]
his premisses, then our degree of contentment will be in proportion to our
contentment with the premisses” (pp. 186–7).
Curiously, the book seems to endorse the hypothetical method (which it
confuses with dialectic) as a way to persuade someone who begins from con-
trary starting points: “Socrates starts from what he himself believes, and after
all his ultimate aim is to bring Thrasymachus and anyone else around to his
own point of view” (p. 189). The book seems unaware that the method it
attributes to Socrates is inferior, that its hypothetical conclusions are obscure in
comparison to the clarity of unhypothetical dialectic: “Since Socrates believes
in his own premisses and disbelieves in Thrasymachus’s . . . this is a quite rea-
sonable way for him—for Socrates—to go” (pp. 186–7). As I have documented
above, the book sees that, in fact, stichomythia rather than persuasion is a
feature of the hypothetical method it attributes to Socrates. So, I cannot tell
why the book endorses discourse that takes for granted one’s own starting points
in conversation with someone who does not share them, and I could find no
reasons anywhere in the book supporting the endorsement.
In my judgment, the Divided Line is right that to elicit the same position from any
starting point is clearer and more persuasive than to be able only to work down to conclusions
from hypotheses taken for granted. And so, the hypothetical method is an inferior way
to persuade.
Let me say in passing that the book’s repeated statements that Socrates uses
assumptions in his argument without securing agreement to them are false.
Certainly, Socrates does painstakingly work from Thrasymachus’ own
position.8 The book does not give a close reading of the arguments with
8. On 340d–345e, see my “Socratic Neutralism,” in D. Cairns, F.-G. Herrmann, and T. Penner
(eds.), The Good and the Form of the Good, (Edinburgh University Press, 2007), pp. 76–92. On
349a–354a, see my Socrates, Pleasure, and Value (Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 97–113.
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Thrasymachus, so I cannot tell why it denies the obvious: Socrates, at every step,
begins with Thrasymachus’ premises in eliciting Socratic conclusions.
The book confuses the hypothetical method for unhypothetical dialectic
throughout, in, for example, its discussions of Republic 2 and 5, the Phaedo, and
the Gorgias. About Socrates’ refutation of Polus and the conclusions reached in
the Gorgias, the book says: “The argument is not the one Socrates would have
chosen, but one that is forced on him by the state of Polus’ thinking” (p. 159).
Evidently, the book imagines that the argument Socrates would freely choose is
one where the interlocutor grants to Socrates without dispute starting points of
Socrates’ own choosing. This is to imagine that Socrates’ preferred method is,
in terms of the Divided Line, the inferior hypothetical account, not the superior
unhypothetical, dialectical account. Notice that a dialectician is never forced to
do things in conversation but freely begins unhypothetically, with whatever
is challenged in conversation, and nevertheless, always derives the same
conclusion.
Conclusion
The book might both reverse its assessment of the relative value of existential
versus academic questions and repent of its antidialecticism, yet nonetheless
maintain its thesis that Plato’s dialogues contain images of philosophical dia-
lectic as well as other genres, all for the sake of persuading the reader to turn
to a life of philosophy. But the book’s Unitarian corollary about Plato’s career
is a lost cause, depending as it does on the claim that in dialectic, different
conclusions come from different starting points—which is precisely the claim falsified
by the Divided Line.
Unitarianism forces the book to interpret Socrates as “forced” (p. 159) rather
than free in conversation. Unitarianism forces the book to see, instead of lucid
argument, a “fog” (p. 11) of Socrates seeming to argue for contrary positions in
different dialogues while in fact holding the same position throughout. The
book’s Unitarianism comes at an exorbitant price: Socratic conversations turn
out to be, in terms of the Divided Line, inferior hypothetical persuasion rather
than superior unhypothetical dialectic. The book does wrong to purchase unity
at such a price. We do better to interpret Socratic conversation as superior
unhypothetical dialectic.
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